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Traditional resource economics has been criticised for assuming too high 
elasticities of substitution, not observing material balance principles and relying 
too much on planner solutions to obtain long-term growth. By analysing a multi-
sector R&D-based endogenous growth model with exhaustible natural resources, 
labour, knowledge, and physical capital as inputs, the present paper addresses this 
critique. We study transitional dynamics and the long-term growth path and 
identify conditions under which firms keep spending on research and 
development. We demonstrate that long-run growth can be sustained under free 
market conditions even when elasticities of substitution between capital and 
resources are low and the supply of physical capital is limited, which seems to be 
crucial for today’s sustainability debate. 
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1.  Introduction
Steady accumulation of man-made capital is the basic source of economic growth.
Capital investments dropped substantially during the high-price period on markets
for non-renewable resources in the 1970s. Since then, known stocks of resources have
increased due to discoveries, prices have moderated, and investments have
recovered. But given the finiteness of resources such as fossil fuels and precious
minerals in the long run, will resource scarcity limit the future level of capital
accumulation? This question is crucial in the context of sustainability, because, to
maintain or increase consumption, capital has to substitute for resources in
production. As soon as investments become critically low, future generations’
welfare levels fall behind those of today’s generations, which means that long-term
development no longer satisfies the sustainability criterion.
Limited substitution of man-made capital for non-renewable natural resources
may be the main obstacle to sustainable development. Most ecological economists
argue that traditional economic theories are overly optimistic in this respect. Three
major issues are under debate. First, to obtain unbounded growth in the standard
neoclassical model, it has to be assumed that either the elasticity of substitution
between natural resources and man-made capital is at least unity, or that exogenous
resource-augmenting technological progress occurs at a constant rate, see the seminal
papers of Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Stiglitz (1974). Second, while many
economic models rely on unlimited accumulation of man-made capital, ecological
economists emphasise that material balances limit the use of physical capital in the
long run, see Cleveland and Ruth (1997). Third, while sustained growth may be
technically feasible, it is not necessarily reached under free market conditions. Low
investment incentives and externalities may result in (too) little investment efforts in
capital that substitutes for resources. Moreover, myopic behaviour may prevent the
implementation by today’s generations of policy measures that are needed to obtain
sustainability for future generations.
The present paper reconsiders investment incentives and the limits to growth in
the presence of non-renewable resource scarcity in a multi-sector endogenous model.
We rule out exogenous technological change that offsets resource depletion as
“manna from heaven”, we bound the total supply of physical capital to take into
account material balances, and we concentrate on market equilibria in which rates of
return drive investment in physical capital and research and development. We show
that growth can be sustained even if elasticities of substitution are small. The multi-
sector structure of the model allows us to identify how substitution between sectors
works as an additional mechanism for the substitution of natural resources. In
particular, it will be shown that the effects on growth depend on which sector of the
economy has poor or abundant substitution possibilities.
We focus on investment in knowledge capital through research and
development (R&D) as the main engine of growth. R&D is often aimed at improving
production techniques and thus at increasing capital productivity. For a large part of
the economy, knowledge is only effective if it is embodied in certain types of physical
capital. The decisive question, which is not answered yet in literature, reads: is it
realistic to predict that knowledge accumulation is so powerful as to outweigh the
physical limits of physical capital services and the limited substitution possibilities
for natural resources? Only if the answer is positive the economy can provide a2
constant or steadily increasing level of average individual utility in the long run,
which is required for development to become sustainable. To eliminate hypothetical
technical solutions for substitution, we focus on market outcomes to find out
whether market incentives are strong enough to produce a sustainable level of
investments in knowledge capital.
The present paper builds on various contributions in literature. The neoclassical
literature on resource economics started with the seminal symposium issue of the
Review of Economic Studies, 1974. This tradition stresses that the marginal returns
on capital (and thus investment incentives) decrease when substitution possibilities
between physical capital and exhaustible natural resources are low. In particular,
Dasgupta and Heal (1974, 1979) show that, without technical progress and with an
elasticity of substitution between natural resources and man-made capital being
lower than unity, sustainable production is impossible. Indeed, if the elasticity of
substitution is zero, which is implicitly assumed in the popular contribution of
Meadows et al. (1972), the economic collapse is inevitable. Furthermore, Solow (1974)
derives that sustainable production may be feasible without technical progress,
whenever the elasticity equals unity. Provided that the production elasticity of
capital exceeds the elasticity of natural resources, an appropriate constant share of
income spent for savings leads to a constant flow of income, see Hartwick (1977).
However, as soon as savings depend on interest rates, this result will not be obtained
under free market conditions. Hence, an equilibrium with non-declining income is
neither optimal nor does arise in a market equilibrium.
Taking into account technical change leads to less pessimistic results. In Stiglitz
(1974), exogenous technical progress leads to sustained growth, which is feasible and
optimal, provided that the elasticity is unity and the discount rate is not too high.
Introducing exogenous resource-augmenting technical progress, sustained growth
becomes feasible even when the elasticity is lower than unity; see Dasgupta and Heal
(1979, p. 207). The optimistic view on technology in neoclassical models is criticised
by Cleveland and Ruth (1997), who argue that in reality substitutability is low, that
the continuity of technical progress is uncertain, and that the accumulation of
physical capital is ultimately limited by biophysical constraints. Under these
assumptions, sustainability indeed becomes a more demanding goal.
Long-run growth does not rely on exogenous technological change in the so-
called new (or endogenous) growth theory developed in the 1990s. The endogenous
accumulation of knowledge and human capital supplements the accumulation of
physical capital as an engine of growth. The broadened view of man-made capital,
the hypothesis of positive knowledge spillovers, and the assumed constant returns to
aggregate capital inputs provide new perspectives on substitution of man-made
capital for natural resources and sustained investment incentives.
For the case a unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and resource
inputs, endogenous knowledge accumulation yields sustained optimal growth in the
presence of non-renewable resources (Schou 1999, Scholz and Ziemes 1999, Aghion
and Howitt 1998, Grimaud and Rougé 2003, Groth and Schou 2002). In the two-sector
endogenous growth model with resource-augmenting knowledge production of
Bovenberg and Smulders (1995), unbounded growth is feasible with elasticities of
substitution between capital and resources that are smaller than unity. However, the
model only applies to renewable resources. This is also true for Bretschger (1998),3
who shows that lower resource use is compatible with sustained endogenous growth
under free market conditions even when technical change is unbiased and the
elasticity of substitution in production is smaller than unity.
The model of the present paper has the following special features.
First, we distinguish between two types of physical capital and knowledge
capital. Physical capital stocks are a direct (but limited) substitute for natural
resources whereas knowledge capital is directed at improving the efficiency of
capital in one of the two consumer sectors. Accordingly, we call this consumer sector
the “knowledge-using” sector. It is assumed that new ideas need to be embodied in a
certain physical body before they can be used as a substitute for a natural resource.
The heterogeneity of physical capital opens the possibilities of productivity gains in
the knowledge-using sector by increasing division of labour. Applying the idea of
expansion-in-varieties, this part of the model builds on Romer (1990) and Grossman
and Helpman (1991). The increasing division of labour is assumed to have a similar
effect on the efficiency of natural resource use, which is a scale effect that has to be
distinguished from the basic substitution effect. In the other consumer sector, capital
productivity depends on the input of skilled labour. As skilled labour is also an
important input into R&D, which produces knowledge through positive spillovers,
this sector is called “knowledge-competing” sector. Deviating from unitary
elasticities, it will become evident that in the knowledge-using sector, a high
elasticity of substitution fosters economic growth. In the knowledge-competing
sector, however, a low elasticity is more favourable for long-term development.
Second, we introduce a non-renewable resource, which represents oil, precious
metals, minerals etc. The resource is used in combination with physical capital to
produce the two final outputs in the knowledge-using and the knowledge-competing
sector. Natural resources are thus important for both sectors. Accordingly, a double-
tracked input substitution process is modelled below.
 Third, we emphasise the distinction between the market value and the
production cost of additional designs. This alludes to Tobin’s q-theory of investment.
Profit expectations in research are a variable that explicitly depends on the price of
physical capital and, indirectly, on the price of the natural resource. On the other
hand, costs of inventions are determined in a separate R&D sector, where skilled
labour and knowledge are used as inputs. As skilled labour is also used in
combination with the natural resource to produce final output, production cost in the
research lab depend on resource prices.
Fourth, we do not exclusively focus on balanced growth paths but also look at
adjustment paths leading to long-run equilibria. During adjustment, goods and
factor prices as well as relative sectoral outputs are allowed to vary. It is shown how
the size of the sectors and the growth rate converge to long-run values according to
the assumed parameters for substitution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the theoretical
five-sector model of the economy with two consumer goods is presented in detail.
Section 3 shows how the model can be solved. Section 4 provides results for
transitional dynamics and long-run growth for different types of parameter and
substitution conditions. Section 5 concludes.4
2.  The model
2.1 Overview
We introduce three primary input factors: a non-renewable natural resource R as
well as skilled labour S and unskilled labour L , see figure 1. Unskilled labour
produces differentiated physical capital components, which are assembled to an
aggregate physical capital stock  Y K . Skilled labour is employed in two activities.
First, the development of designs for new capital components requires skills. Second,
skilled labour produces the physical capital good  T K . The natural resource is
combined with the two capital stocks and produces “standard” T -goods  in the
knowledge-competing sector and “high-tech” Y-goods in the knowledge-using
sector. The substitution of capital for the natural resource takes place in both sectors:
in the high-tech sector, which determines the reward to research investments, and in
the standard sector, which affects wages of skilled labour and therefore production
costs of new designs. Knowledge capital is accumulated through positive spillovers
in research and is an input into subsequent R&D; it is the driving force for long-run
development.
The essential elements of our model set-up are, first, substitution across
sectors between goods that differ in their knowledge intensity and, second, (poor)
substitution between man-made inputs and resources within sectors. The degree of
within-sector substitution may differ across sectors. By combining these different





Let us discuss the different productive sectors of the model in turn, beginning with
high-tech goods, followed by standard goods, the two types of capital goods, and,
finally, R&D.
High-tech goods Y are produced with different physical capital services k and
natural resources R as inputs. We adopt a nested CES-function. The constant
elasticity of substitution between aggregate capital and natural resources σ  in the Y-
sector take any positive value. Aggregate capital input is a CES-index of a continuum
of differentiated components of mass n; the constant elasticity of substitution
between them equals 1/(1 – β )>0. Each producer in the high-tech sector uses all types





jY Yk d j n R
σ
σ σ σ
βσ βδ σ θθ
− − − 
 =+ − ⋅
 
∫ ,( 1 )5
where  0,1 β θ << , and  ,0 δσ >  are given parameters. In a symmetrical equilibrium,
the quantities of capital services k are equal for the different components, i.e.
12 ... n kk kk == == . With n different components at a certain point of time, aggregate
input of capital services is denoted by
Y Kn k =⋅ . (2)
Due to gains from specialization, an expansion-in-varieties of capital components
leads to productivity gains of Y-producers. According to (1), holding aggregate
capital input  Y K  constant, the production of the high-tech goods increases with the
number of capital components, n. In a similar way, it is reasonable to argue that Y-
producers are able to use natural resources the more efficiently, the higher is the
specialization of capital components a given amount of resources is combined with.
We will come back to this point when discussing the general results at the end of
section 4. The gains from specialization for both types of inputs can be seen more
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The specialization effect of an additional capital variety is given by (1 − β )/β  whereas
the efficiency gain of resources R used with additional varieties is expressed by the
factor  δ . If  0 δ = , there is no efficiency gain from resource use. Rearranging the
above equation, we find:
()
/( 1) 1/ (1 )/ (1 )/ ( 1)/ (1 )( ) YY Yn Qn K n R
− − −− − −  =⋅ =⋅ + − 
σσ σσ ββ ββ σ σ ν θθ (3)
with  (1 ) / =− − νβ βδ . The expression in brackets on the r.h.s. of (3) corresponds to
the familiar CES-approach of resource economics, see Dasgupta/Heal (1979, p. 199).
It aggregates capital inputs  Y K  and effective resource inputs  Y nR
− ν  into a composite
input Q. The total factor productivity term preceding brackets is the result of the
expansion-in-varieties approach according to Romer (1990) and Grossman/Helpman
(1991). Note that the degree of specialization (measured by n) affects productivity in
two ways. First, it raises total factor productivity. Second, it introduces a bias in
technological change: if (1 ) − σν  < 0 technological change is capital-using; if (1 ) − σν
> 0, it is resource-using.
The market for Y-goods is fully competitive. Producers take prices of output,
resource inputs and capital components (denoted by  , YR pp  and  kj p , respectively) as
given. They maximize total profits 
0
n
YR Y k j j pY pR pkd j −− ∫ , subject to the production
function (1). Under symmetry ( kj kY pp = ), see (2), relative demand for capital and
















The production of standard goods T requires homogenous capital  T K  and
resources  T R  as inputs. We use again a CES-formulation:
()
11 1
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(5)
with  ω  being the elasticity of substitution in the T-sector and 01 η << . Producers
take prices as given and maximize profits  TK T T R T pT p K pR −−  subject to (5). This














The  differentiated capital services k are produced by monopolists. The
production of one unit requires one unit of unskilled labour L. The profit maximizing
monopolistic supplier faces a price elasticity of demand equal to –1/(1 – β ). As in the
standard Dixit-Stiglitz approach, this follows from the Y-producers demand for k.
Thus, the monopolist optimally sets a rental rate that is a mark-up 1/β  times the
labour costs wL. All monopolistic suppliers set this same price:
/ kY L pw = β (7)
Associated profits π  for each supplier of a capital components can be calculated as:
(1 ) /   kY Y pK n =− ⋅ ⋅ π β .( 8 )
Profits are used to cover the expenses for fixed costs in the production of k-goods,
which consist of payments for the blueprint of the capital component. Each design
contains the know-how for the production of one capital component k. Thus, each k-
firm has to acquire one design as an up-front investment before it can start
production.
New blueprints n !  are produced in the R&D sector. Per blueprint, a/n units of
skilled labour are required. Here it is assumed that an increase in variety also
increases the stock of public knowledge on which R&D builds so that research cost
decline with n. Thus, the cost of a blueprint, cn, equals:
(/) nS ca n w =⋅ (9)
The production of one unit of homogenous capital  T K  used in the T-sector requires
skilled labour  T S and materials inputs M according to a Cobb-Douglas production7
function  TT KS M
υ µ = . We assume that materials are fully recyclable, such that each
moment in time a fixed stock, of which we normalize the size to M = 1, is available.
For simplicity, we disregard recycling costs, set  1 = υ , and assume perfect
competition. The price of capital then equals the wage of skilled labour  S w :
KT S pw = . (10)
2.3 Capital markets
There are three assets i.e. investment possibilities in the economy: riskless bonds,
patents for the production of capital varieties k, and natural resources R. Let  n p
denote the market price of a patent in time t and consider the brief time interval
between t and t+dt. In this time, the return for an investment of size  n p  in a bond is
n rp d t ⋅⋅ . A firm holding a patent for the production of an intermediate capital input
earns an infinite stream of profits. Per-period profit π  is given in (8). So in the same
time interval, the total return on a patent is  n dt p dt ⋅+ ⋅ ! π  which yields the following
no-arbitrage condition:
nn pr p += ⋅ ! π (11)
Perfect capital markets affect the timing of R&D. Over a small period dt with positive
investment in R&D, inventors should be indifferent between incurring the R&D cost
n c at the beginning or the end of the period. That is, the return to postponing
investment, which amounts to interest payments on postponed costs  n rc dt , should
equal the cost of postponing, which amount to forgone dividends and change
() n cd t π+ ⋅ ! . However, if over a small period the net benefits of postponing
investment are positive, no investment will take place in this period. Hence, we may
write the following no-arbitrage condition:
nn cr c +≤⋅ ! π with equality (inequality) if  0 n > !  ( 0 n = ! ). (12)
The final no-arbitrage condition concerns the comparison of returns between
bonds and stocks of natural resources. Resource owners extract resources without
costs and supply them at spot prices, which are denoted by  R p  per unit of R. The
returns for investments of size  R p  in bonds during the brief time interval between t
and t+dt are  R rp ⋅ . In analogy to above, the return per unit of the stock of natural
resource R can be expressed as  RR dt p dt π ⋅+ ⋅ ! . However, it is a basic characteristic of
natural resources to have no direct return like capital goods, i.e. it is that  0 R π = . So
in equilibrium we are left with:
RR pr p =⋅ ! (13)
The Hotelling-rule in (13) implies that resource owners are exactly indifferent
between selling resources (and investing the profit with interest rate r ) and
preserving the stock of resources. The compensation for keeping the stock is the price
rise of the resource.8
2.4 Factor  markets
The total stock of resource R at time t is denoted by WR. It is depleted according to:
RY T WR R =− − ! , (0) R W  given,  () 0 R Wt≥ , (14)
()
0
() () ( 0 )
∞
+= ∫ YT R Rt Rtd t W , (15)
which says that any flow of resource use depletes the total resource stock
proportionally, that the resource stock is predetermined, and that the stock can never
become negative. Profit maximization by resource owners implies that the price of
natural resources increases at a rate equal to the interest rate, see (13). Resource
owners do not have an incentive to conserve a part of the stock so that total
extraction must be equal to the total resource stock in equilibrium, see (15). Total
extraction can be ensured by setting the optimum price at the beginning of
optimisation. Initial price level and price increase of natural resources do not deviate
from the optimum path, provided that agents form rational expectations. This will be
assumed in the following.
The market for skilled labour is in equilibrium if the fixed supply S equals
demand for production of capital and for research labour:
(/) T SK a n n =+ ⋅! (16)
The market for unskilled labour clears, which requires that demand for unskilled
labour from the differentiated capital goods sector equals the fixed supply L:
Y LK = . (17)
2.5 Consumer sector
The representative household maximizes a lifetime utility function subject to the
usual intertemporal budget constraint; the function is additively separable in time
and contains logarithmic intratemporal utility of the Cobb-Douglas type:
τ τ
τ ρ d C e t U
t
t ) ( log ) (
) ( ∫
∞ − − =→  max (18)
with 
1 CYT
φφ − =⋅ (19)
The Cobb-Douglas specification in (19) implies constant expenditure shares for T-












where  (, ) TY pp  is the price of T-goods (Y-goods). Intertemporal optimisation gives
the well-known Keynes-Ramsey rule stating that the growth rate of consumer
expenditures is equal to the difference between the nominal interest rate r and the
discount rate ρ , that is:
ˆ ˆT pT r +=− ρ . (21)
where hats denore growth rates.
Finally, intertemporal utility maximization requires that the value of
household wealth, npn, discounted by the interest rate, r, approaches zero if time goes
to infinity. This transversality condition can be written as:
ˆˆ lim ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 tn nt p t rt →∞ +− <. (22)
3.  Solving the model
To facilitate the analysis, we reduce the model to three differential equations, which
characterize the dynamics of the system. Our three key variables will be the capital
shares in the knowledge-using and knowledge competing sectors, to be denoted by θ
and η respectively, and the growth rate of product variety, also to be interpreted as
the rate of innovation or the growth rate of the (public) knowledge stock, to be











ˆ gn = . (25)
Note that the initial knowledge stock, n(0), is given. Because total revenue equals
total cost for energy and capital inputs, the energy shares in the two sectors are given
by 1/ RT T pR pT −= η  and 1 / RY Y pR pY −= θ , respectively. Inserting the definitions (23) and
(24) into the firms demand functions (4) and (6), differentiating (4) and (7) with respect to
time and using (7), (10) and (13) to eliminate capital and resource prices, we find:
ˆ ˆ (1 )(1 )( ) L rw g =− − − − + θθ σ ν, (26)
ˆˆ (1 )(1 )( ) S rw =− − − − η ηω . (27)10
The equations show how interest cost, wage changes, and technical change (only in
the Y-sector) drive factor substitution.
Substituting (23) and (24) into (19) to eliminate  Y pY and  T pT and inserting (7)











This equation reflects that in final-goods market equilibrium the relative wage of
unskilled labour increases with the share of capital in the unskilled-labour-intensive
Y-sector (θ ), increases with the share of the Y-good in total demand for final goods
(φ ), and falls with the relative abundance of unskilled labour.
Substituting  ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ TS T pT wK += + − η , which follows from (24) and (10), into (21),
we find:
ˆ ˆˆ ST rw K ρ η −= +− . (29)
Substituting (25) into (16), we express KT in terms of the innovation rate:
T KS a g =− . (30)
From (28), (29) and (26) and from (29), (30) and (27), we derive the following
equations of motion for the cost shares, respectively:
(1 )(1 )
()
1( 1 ) ( 1 )
g
 −−
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Dividing the capital market equilibrium (12) by the R&D cost cn, inserting (7),











. with equality for  0 g > (33)
This right-hand side of (33) represents the rate of return to R&D. It increases with the
mark-up rate 1/β and with the size of the market as captured by L, which is the
labour supply that produces the stock of physical capital in which innovations are
embodied. The rate of return falls with the cost of R&D, which is proportional to awS.
Substituting (30), (28), (27) and (32) into (33), we find:11
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Equations (34), (32) and (31) now form a dynamic system in three variables,
which are the rate of innovation g, the share of capital in Y-goods production θ , and
the share of capital in T-goods production η . None of these three variables is
predetermined, so we need to formulate the conditions that restrict initial values and
end values of them. Crucial is that cumulative extraction cannot exceed the available
resource stock, see (13) and (14). We therefore need to focus on extraction and
express it in terms of our key variables g, η  and θ . Eliminating prices between (4) and
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   (38)
After choosing initial values for θ, η , and g, equations (36), (37) and (38), together
with the given initial value n(0) and equations (25), (32), (31), (34), and (35), allow us
to calculate the extraction path. The initial values for θ, η , and g must be chosen such
that the no-depletion condition (15) holds and the transversality condition (22) holds.
In a steady state without innovation,  ˆ lim ( ) 0 t nt →∞ = , discounted stock prices change
at rate  ˆ /0 nn pr p −= − π < , see (11). The transversality condition (22) then always
holds. In a steady state with innovation (lim ( ) 0 t gt →∞ > ), stock prices equal the cost of
innovation,  / nS pa w n = , see (9), (11) and (12). Then, the transversality condition (22)
boils down to:
ˆ lim ( ) ( ) 0 tS rt w t →∞ −> for lim ( ) 0 t gt →∞ > (39)
For future use, we express sectoral depletion rates in both final goods sectors
in terms of the three key variables. Differentiating (36) and (37) with respect to time
and substituting (31) and (32), we find, respectively:12
[]
1 ˆ (1 )
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4.  Solutions for different substitution conditions
To see the different mechanisms in the model most clearly, it is useful to first
consider three specific cases for parameter values which are obtained by setting
either elasticity of substitution or both elasticities equal to one. After that, the general
case is evaluated in section 4.4.
4.1 Cobb-Douglas Case
We first study unitary elasticities both in the knowledge-using and the knowledge-
competing sector, i.e.  1 σω == . From (32) and (31), we see that θ  and η  are constant;
(36) and (37), or equivalently (4) and (7), reveal that they equal the parameters θ  and
η , respectively. Then the dynamics is represented by a single differential equation
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The corresponding phase diagram is drawn in figure 2 for the case  (/) (/) Sa Φθ η > ρ.
The path converging to a negative growth rate must be ruled out. The same holds for
the path converging to  / gS a = , since it violates the transversality condition (39)
(first substituting  ˆ 0 η= , (30) and (34) into (29), and then setting  / gS a = , we find
ˆ /0 S rw S a −= − < ). Hence, the equilibrium growth rate jumps to the value for which
0 g = !  and remains there. Thus, the equilibrium growth equals:









The rate of innovation is stimulated by a higher supply of skilled labour S, a lower
unit input coefficient research a, and a lower discount rate ρ . This corresponds to the
findings in other R&D-models. Our multi-sector model reveals ho innovation
incentives depend on the expenditures shares and factor shares. In particular, the
rate of innovation increases with  / Φ θη , which captures three effects. First, since
innovation takes place in the Y-sector only, a higher expenditure share on Y-goods
(Φ ) boosts innovation. Second, since innovation is embodied in physical capital13
goods in the Y-sector, a greater role for capital, as measured by a larger capital share
in the Y-sector  θ , increases the market for innovations and boosts research.
Alternatively, a high value for θ  implies a low share of non-renewable resources in
Y-production: the sector is less dependent on non-man-made inputs and this
stimulates innovation. Finally, and most important, innovation is high when the
share of non-renewable resources in the T-sector is high (low η ). If the T-sector relies
heavily on resources rather than skilled labour input, less skilled labour is allocated
in this sector, and more becomes available for the research sector. Hence, greater
natural-resource dependence in the knowledge-competing sector reduces output in
this sector, but raises innovation.
Fig. 2
(about here)
To study how resource dependence is related to growth of consumption rather than
innovation, we need to calculate output growth in both final goods sectors. Besides
innovation, only depletion of resource inputs drives growth, since labour and
materials inputs are constant. The rate of depletion equals the discount rate
( ˆˆ
YT RR −= −= ρ ), see (40)-(41). Differentiating consumption and production functions
(19), (3) and (5) with respect to time and substituting (40)-(41), we obtain the
consumption growth rate according to:
() () ˆ 1/1 ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) Cg   =− + − − − + − −   θ ββ θδ φφ θ φ η ρ . (43)
Consumption grows at a positive rate only if the right-hand side of (43) is positive:
innovation (at rate g, see first term at right-hand side) has to be sufficient to offset the
decline in resource inputs (at rate ρ, see second term) and to overcome the constancy
of physical capital inputs. For a given rate of innovation (g), consumption growth is
the bigger, the higher are the gains from specialisation (low β ), the larger are
productivity spillovers (δ ), the lower is the discount rate, and the higher are the
factor shares θ  and η . A lower discount rate (ρ) reduces resource depletion and
implies a smaller drag on growth from the scarcity of non-renewable resources.  For
a given rate of innovation g, a higher capital share in both sectors (θ  and η ) imply
smaller dependence of production on non-man-made scarce resource inputs, which
is good for growth.
Overall, resource dependence in the knowledge-competing sector (as
measured by 1-η ) has an ambiguous impact on growth. First, higher resource
dependence makes T-goods more expensive and shifts skilled labour to innovation
activities, which increases growth through innovation (see (42)). However, higher
resource dependence implies that the decline in necessary resource inputs in
production weighs more heavily, which reduces consumption growth (see (43)).
Substituting (42) into (43) and differentiating growth with respect to η , we find:
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ηθ β φφ ρ
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where  τ  stands for the expression in the first brackets in (43) and represents the
effect of innovation on output growth in the Y-sector. The inequality reveals that for
(1 ) / − ηφ φ  sufficiently small, higher resource dependence in the knowledge-
competing sector goes together with higher growth rates.
We finally need to solve for the initial levels. Initial resource use is calculated
by using the fact that the rate of extraction  ˆ R  decreases with the discount rate (see 40
and 41) and cumulative extraction corresponds to total resource stock. This gives
(0) (0) (0) TY R RR W += ρ ⋅ . For a given initial knowledge stock n(0), we can calculate the
initial consumption and income levels. Note that a change in the initial knowledge
stock, n(0), has no effect on initial factor shares and the innovation rate. The reason is
that with a Cobb-Douglas production function, technological change is neutral with
respect to production factors and affects levels of output without changing relative
prices.
4.2 Poor substitution in the knowledge-using sector
The assumption of a unitary elasticity of substitution in the knowledge-competing
sector, i.e. setting  1 = ω , reduces the model to a two-dimensional system in g and θ ,
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The corresponding phase diagram is depicted in figure 3. We have drawn the
diagram assuming that ν  is positive, so that the  0 = ! θ  locus appears in the negative
quadrant. If µ  is positive, but sufficiently small to prevent the  0 = ! θ  locus to intersect
the  0 g = !  locus, the dynamics will be qualitatively the same. Any path converging to
g=S/a violates the transversality condition and must be ruled out. Any path that hits
the g=0 line at  / aS θ>η ρ Φ  must also be ruled out since it violates (35). It can be seen
that there is a unique trajectory that neither does violate the transversality condition
(39) nor condition (35). This saddle path lies below the  0 g = !  locus. The economy
jumps on the saddle path and asymptotically approaches the equilibrium with
0 g == θ .
Which point on the saddle path is the equilibrium for a given initial resource
and knowledge stock, is determined by (15), (36) and (38). The saddle path defines θ
as a function of g, say  () ( () ) θ= tf g t . Substituting this and η=η  into (37) and (38), we
find aggregate resource use, RT(t)+RY(t), as a function of g(t). Since we know the
equation of motion for g, this solves for the entire extraction path. In equilibrium, g(0)
must be such that cumulative extraction over the entire horizon exactly equals the
initial resource stock WR(0). It now follows that a higher initial resource stock implies
an initial point further to the right on the saddle path. So a (sufficiently large)15
resource boom boosts short-run growth. A higher initial knowledge stock increases
depletion for given θ  and g, see (36). Hence to prevent running out of resources, a
higher knowledge stock implies higher resource prices, and a lower initial growth
rate in equilibrium.
During the adjustment, the rate of innovation g gradually falls to zero and
then remains zero; the share of capital θ  steadily falls. With rising resource prices and
poor substitution in the Y-sector, compensation for R&D-investments is steadily
falling. Skilled labour moves from the R&D to the T-sector. From the phase diagram
it is clear that innovation stops when θ  reaches the level that is implied by the
intersection between the  0 g = !  locus and the g = 0 axis,  / aS θη ρ =Φ . This means that
in finite time, resource prices reach such a high level that R&D becomes unprofitable.
From then on, all skilled labour is in the knowledge-competing sector, knowledge




The main conclusion from this case is that poor substitution in the knowledge-using
sector is unambiguously unfavourable for innovation and growth.
4.3 Poor substitution in the knowledge-competing sector
Assuming a unitary elasticity for the knowledge-using sector, i.e. setting  1 σ =  so that
= θθ , see (31) and (36), the model reduces to a two-dimensional system in g and η ,
that reads, according to (34) and (32):
[] () 1 1 ( 1 ) ( 1 )
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The corresponding phase diagram is depicted in figure 4. Any path converging to
η =1 must be ruled out since it violates the transversality condition (it implies  ˆ 0 η> ,
so that  ˆ 0 S rw −< , see (27), which violates (39)). Any path converging to g=0 and η =0
must also be ruled out since it violates (35). Hence, the economy jumps on the saddle
path, which lies between the  0 η = !  and  0 g = !  loci, and asymptotically approaches the
equilibrium with  0 η =  and g = S/a.
Which point on the saddle path is the equilibrium for a given initial resource
and knowledge stock, is determined by (15) and (37)-(38). The saddle path defines η
as a function of g, say  () ( () ) η= tF g t . Substituting this and θ=θ  into (37) and (38), we16
find aggregate resource use, RT(t)+RY(t), as a function of g(t). Since we know the
equation of motion for g, this solves for the entire extraction path. In equilibrium, g(0)
must be such that cumulative extraction over the entire horizon exactly equals the
initial resource stock WR(0). As in the Cobb-Douglas case in section 4.1, the initial
condition n(0) has no effect on the growth rate. However, a higher initial resource
stock implies an equilibrium with a higher cost share η (0), and a lower growth rate
g(0).
During the adjustment, the growth rate increases. This happens because, with
rising resource prices and poor substitution in the T-sector, T-production becomes
relatively more expensive. Skilled labour moves from the T-sector to R&D. In the
long run, all skilled labour is in research so that that the asymptotic growth rate is
/ Sa  irrespective of further model parameters.
Fig. 4
(about here)
The main conclusion from this case is that poor substitution is in the knowledge-
competing sector is not a problem for growth and investment in man-made
(knowledge) capital. To the contrary: the rate of innovation in the steady state is
higher than in the case with unitary elasticities in both sectors, the case considered in
the previous section.
To draw conclusions about consumption growth rather than innovation, we
need to calculate again the rate of consumption growth. In the long run, the rate of
depletion is again equal to the discount rate. However, depletion has a greater
weight in production in the case of poor substitution, since its share tends to one in
the long run, (1 ) 1 −→ η . Therefore, on the one hand the poor substitution case yields
higher growth because of faster innovation, but on the other hand it yields a bigger
drag on growth through depletion. We can show that the former effect dominates the
latter, so that less substitution in the knowledge-competing sector implies higher long-run
growth. Equation (43) still holds, provided η  is replaced by  0 η = . After substituting g
= S/a and  0 = η , we find the long-run growth rate of consumption for the case with σ
= 1 > ω  :
() () 1, 1 | ˆ 1/1 ( 1 ) ( 1 )
S
C
a =<   =− + − − − + −   σω θ ββ θδ φφ θ φρ . (44)
This growth rate exceeds the growth rate of consumption with unitary elasticities in
both sectors, cf. (42)-(43), by the following positive amount:
1, 1 1, 1 ||
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4.4 Poor substitution in both consumer sectors
We now turn to the general – and most interesting – case with elasticities unequal
unity in both sectors. To be on the conservative side with respect to technological
opportunities, we assume poor substitution, 01 , 01 <σ< <ω< , and small spillovers17
to resource augmenting so that technological change is resource-using,
(1 ) / 0 =− −> νβ β δ . We have to examine the full system of three differential
equations (32), (31), and (34), the latter to be replaced by (35) in a corner solution.
Solving for  0 g ηθ === ! !!  with  0 g ≥ , we can identify the different steady states.
From equation of motion (31), we see that θ  always falls, so that in the steady
state θ  must approach zero. Furthermore, from (32) we see that constancy of η  in the
steady state requires either η  = 0 or η  = 1. Since η =1 can only be reached if  ˆ 0 > η  at
time infinity, and since  ˆ 0 > η  violates the transversality condition (see (27) and (39)),
any path converging to η  = 1 must be ruled out. Hence, in the long run both θ  and η
approach zero:
() 0 , () 0 ∞→ ∞→ η θ . (45)
According to (34), the dynamics of g depend on the ratio θ/η. The growth rates of θ
and η approach asymptotically a (strictly negative) constant. Subtracting (32) from
(31) and substituting (45), we find how the steady state ratio θ/η evolves over time:
1 ˆ ˆ () () () g
−−





Depending on parameters, three types of steady states arise: an interior solution, a
corner solution with zero innovation, or a corner solution with maximal innovation.
First consider for which value of θ(∞)/η(∞) an interior steady state, 0 < g(∞) < S/a, can
arise. The inequality in (35) rules out θ(∞)/η(∞) → 0, since this would imply g = 0.
Equation (34) rules out θ(∞)/η(∞)→∞ since this would imply  0 g < ! . Hence θ(∞)/η(∞)
must be a constant in an interior steady state. This requires the both sides of equation
(46) to be zero, so that  () ( ) /( 1 ) g ∞= − − ρ σων σ ω . This solution is an interior solution,
0 < g(∞) < S/a, only if  () ( ) /( 1 ) g ∞= − − ρ σων σ ω < S/a, which can be reformulated as
0( ) ( 1 ) / Sa <− < − σω ρ σω ν .  Second, consider the case σ < ω. We see from (46) that
then  ˆ ˆ () () 0 ∞− ∞< θη , so that θ(∞)/η(∞)→0, which implies, by (35), the corner solution
g = 0. Third, if 0( 1 ) / ( ) Sa <− < − σω ν σ ω ρ   and g(∞) → S/a, we see from (46) that
ˆ ˆ () () 0 ∞− ∞> θη  so that θ(∞)/η(∞) → ∞. Equation (34) reveals that this is a steady state
(g ! =0) provided (/)(/ ) Sa g ⋅− θη  approaches a bounded constant that is smaller than
// Sa + ρ ω . This is a rational expectations equilibrium as we show in the appendix,
where we use (34) to solve for the steady state value of (/)(/ ) Sa g ⋅− θη  in each
equilibrium.
Collecting these results we have:




























The equations in (48) show that for given parameters, there is a unique steady
state. In the appendix we show the existence and stability of these steady states as
well as the transition paths to the steady states, which - together with the initial
stocks n(0) and WR(0) - define the initial conditions for all endogenous variables. The
remainder of the section discusses the results and the implications for consumption
growth.
Equation (47b) reveals that innovation incentives keep intact and a constant
innovation rate can be maintained in the long run even with poor substitution,
provided substitution in the knowledge-using Y-sector is better than in the R&D-
competing T-sector (0 < ω < σ < 1). To understand this result, we have to sort out why
there is no incentive for skilled labour to move out of or into R&D in the long run.
Two opposing – but inseparable – forces, from depletion and technological change
respectively, determine labour allocation. On the one hand, as the resource stock is
depleted and the amount of resource input per unit of labour falls, the wage falls,
especially for the type of labour that is the poorest substitute for the resource. Thus, if
ω < σ, the T-sector is hurt most by depletion and the relative wage of skilled labour,
which is employed in this sector, falls. This lowers innovation costs and tends to raise
innovation. On the other hand, any shift into R&D speeds up the pace of innovation,
which makes capital goods relatively more abundant, lowers their reward (provided
(1 ) 0 −> σν , see (4)), and lowers the profits from innovation. On balance, in the
interior steady state (47b), innovation takes place at a rate that makes profits from
innovation fall at the same rate as costs of innovation (which happens because of
depletion).  The steady state with maximal R&D (47c) arises if the supply of skilled
labour is small since then the supply of skilled labour constrains the rate of
innovation such that the depletion effect dominates: the relative wage paid by the T-
sector falls even if asymptotically all skilled labour has moved out of the T-sector into
R&D. The zero innovation steady state (47a) arises if substitution is poorest in the Y-
sector since then both depletion and innovation reduce the returns to innovation.
The interaction between depletion and innovation implies that the innovation
rate becomes bounded by substitution elasticities when the supply of skilled labour
grows large. With ω < σ < 1, and S sufficiently large that (47b) applies, a rise in skilled
labour supply does not affect the innovation rate. Hence, the so-called scale effect, for
which endogenous growth model were criticised (notably by Jones 1995, 1999), is not
present. The reason is that the growth rate is determined by the equality of depletion
and innovation bias effect, so that g is solely governed by technical and preference
parameters, notably the elasticities (note that the scale effect is present in the case
with σ = 1, see section 4.1 and 4.3).
Another remarkable feature of the interior long-run innovation rate in (47b) is
that it rises with the discount rate. In the Cobb-Douglas case (section 4.1), and in
most endogenous growth models, the opposite happens. Usually, discounting
disfavours investment in general and investment in R&D in particular. However, in
the present model there are two types of investment, resource conservation and
innovation. Higher discounting reduces investment in the resources by speeding up
depletion, see (40)-(41). Thus the wage of skilled labour in the T-sector falls relatively
faster, which reduces the cost of R&D and speeds up innovation.19
In the long run, with  0 η θ ==  growth of consumption is (equation (43) still
holds, provided η  and θ  are replaced by  0 η =  and  0 = θ ):
ˆ Cg φ δ ρ =−
From this equation it becomes clear that growing consumption requires  0 δ > , that is,
endogenous knowledge has to affect the productivity of resource use in Y-
production positively, or, in other words, technological change is resource-
augmenting. In this case, long-run consumption growth is (technically) feasible in
principle. However, our analysis shows that in the market equilibrium, consumption
grows in the long run only if in addition to δ   > 0, substitution is higher in the
knowledge-using sector than in the knowledge-competing sector (σ  > ω ), and the
discount rate is low enough.
5. Conclusions
This paper shows that unbounded economic growth can be sustained if non-
renewable resources are an essential input in production, even without exogenous
technological change and with elasticities of substitution between man-made capital
and resources which lie below unity. We have used a multi-sector framework in
which differences in substitution opportunities across sectors cause labour to move
from production to R&D when the resource stock becomes depleted. Poor
substitutability in the sector that competes for skilled labour input with the R&D
sector turns out to be favourable for growth. Resource depletion makes final goods
production activities that heavily rely on resources more expensive. Thus, increased
resource scarcity lowers the opportunity costs of innovation and shifts labour from
final goods production to innovation effort. The sectoral shift supplements input
changes as a substitution mechanism. As a consequence, growth is higher with this
kind of poor substitutability compared to the case of unitary elasticities. In contrast,
strong dependence on resources in the sector that implements the innovations is bad
for growth: with a poor substitutability in this case, resource depletion increases
production costs and lowers the demand for innovations. We conclude that the
relative resource dependence of the knowledge-using and knowledge-competing
sectors (measured by cost shares and elasticities of substitution) determine whether
incentives for investment and innovation are sustained and growth is unbounded in
the presence of poor substitution possibilities. We also find that in the case of poor
substitution, the size of the elasticities of substitution, rather than resource and
labour endowments, bound the rate of growth. Hence in the interior solution, the
scale of the economy has no effect on long-run growth.
We have made some simplifying assumptions that may be relaxed in future
research. First, we have stressed that (in contrast to knowledge capital) physical
capital inputs are bounded because material use is bounded. Instead of completely
abstracting from increases in the physical capital stock, physical capital accumulation
can be modelled subject to explicit material balances constraints.  Second, we have
modelled technological change embodied in capital goods and we have found that if
research spillovers are large, technological change may become resource-saving.20
Alternatively, we may model two types of innovation, one directed at improving
capital productivity and the other at resource productivity. Third, we have
abstracted from resource extraction costs and polluting resource use, which may be
taxed by the government. These features may change the price profile of the resource
but they hit both consumer sectors in the same way. As the effects of price changes in
the two sectors work in opposite direction, as seen in sections 4.2 and 4.3, the quality
of our results is not expected to change substantially when enlarging the general
model set-up in this way. Fourth, to keep the set-up tractable we have assumed that
there are two specific labour factors and that no innovation is possible in one of the
sectors. The use of a single type of labour does not qualitatively change the results.
The difference of the two sectors concerning knowledge use is an extreme form of
input intensity which is not decisive for the outcome either. Finally, as the paper
focuses on market solutions, the issue of optimal policies has not been treated.
Resource use produces no negative externalities in this model, only R&D generates
positive spillovers which leads, as in the original “Romer-type” approach to R&D, to
positive subsidies for innovations in the social optimum.
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Appendix to section 4.4
This appendix studies existence and stability of the steady state with poor
substitution in both sectors (01 , 01 <σ< <ω< , and  0 ν> ). Because  g !  depends on
/ θη , see (34), whereas η = 0 in the steady state, see (45), we cannot directly
differentiate the system in the steady state. Instead of studying the dynamics in terms
of θ, η, and g, we therefore rewrite the system in terms of the three endogenous




θ  =Φ −  η 
.   (A.1)
Existence of steady state with positive growth
We first examine a steady state with positive growth. Substituting  /(/ ) hS a g θ= η Φ −
into from (34), (32) and (31), and subsequently setting  0 θ=η= , see (45), we find that
the following must hold in such a steady state:
0





1 ˆ 1 hh g
 ρ− σ  =−−+ ν   σσ  
(A.3)
Moreover, if g > 0,  0 η→  and  0 θ→ , the transversality condition boils down to (see
(28), (33) and (39)):
ˆ 0 S rw hg −= − > (A.4)
From these three equations, it follows immediately that a positive growth rate
requires  / hg ≤+ρ ω , which rules out that h goes to infinity, which requires by (A.3)
that  [1 (1 ) / ] / hg ≤− µ −σ σ + ρ σ . The transversality condition rules out that h goes to
zero, which requires by (A.3) that  [1 (1 ) / ] / hg ≥− µ −σ σ + ρ σ . Hence, a positive
growth rate requires constant h and from setting (A.3) equal zero we get
( ) ( ) [1 (1 ) / ] / hg ∞= ∞⋅ + ν − σ σ+ ρ σ .
Substituting this solution into (A.2), and setting  0 g = ! , we find two solutions for
the innovation rate, corresponding to (47b) and (47c).
Existence of steady state without innovation.
See main text.
Local stability
We prove that the steady state in the case of poor substitution in both sectors
( 1, 1 ω< σ< ) has two negative eigenvalues and one positive eigenvalue. We save on25
notation by defining / sS a = . Provided that  g is not at its corner g = 0, we may write












−σ −   Φ−   =− − ρ − ρ + ν 
 η  −− σ −   Φ−  
!
(1 )(1 )( ) hg η=−η −η −ω − ! (A.5)
{} ()[ ( 1 ) ] () gs g h g =− ρ − ω +− ω η− !
The Jacobian of this system is:
///
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(1 )(1 ) 1
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(1 ) [( 1) ]
Jh g
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  −σ −θ θ
=− +ν − ρ+ν   σ+ −σθ − σ+ −σθ  
Interior growth rate, IG
First, consider the steady state with 0 gs << . In this case, we have
(/) [ ( 1 ) ] /( 1 ) IG hh = ρ ω σ−ω+ν −σ ν −σ ≡ ,  0 η= ,  (/) ( ) /( 1 ) IG gg =ρωσ − ω ν − σ≡ . To
facilitate calculations, note also that  [1 (1 ) / ] / / hg g =+ ν − σ σ + ρ σ= + ρ ω . For this
equilibrium, all elements of the Jacobian J turn out to be finite, and the Jacobian can
be evaluated as:
12 [1 (1 ) / ]
(, 0 , ) 0 ( 1 ) / 0







−+ ν − σ σ 
 =− ρ − ω ω 
 −− ω−− ρ− ωω − ω 
We find that the determinant is positive:
1
Det ( ,0, ) (1 ) ( ) 0 IG IG IG IG Jh g h s g
−σ
=ν − ω ρ −>
σ26
Because the second row has zero elements only, except for the diagonal element, the





−ω  λ= − ρ  ω 
.
Since the determinant of the Jacobian, which equals the product of the three
eigenvalues, is positive, we must have  123 Det 0 J =λλλ > , so there are two negative
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22
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22
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hs g hs g s g h
hs g hs g s g h
λ = +ω − − +ω − + ω − ν −σ σ<
λ = +ω − + +ω − + ω − ν −σ σ>
Maximum growth rate, MG
Next consider the steady state equilibrium with gs → . For this case, we evaluate the
Jacobian at  [1 (1 ) / ] / MG hs h =+ ν − σ σ + ρ σ ≡ ,  0 η= , gs = . To facilitate calculations,
note that it implies  0 θ= ,  [1 (1 ) / ] / / hg g =+ ν − σ σ + ρ σ< + ρ ω . For this equilibrium,
J12 and J13 cannot be evaluated because they involve a division by zero. However, the
determinant and the characteristic equation can be determined since multiplying
elements from the first row with elements from the third row always gives finite
expressions. In particular, the determinant and characteristic equation can be written
as:
Det ( ,0, ) (1 )( )[ ( )] 0 MG MG MG MG Jh s h h s h s =− ω − ρ−ω − >
0 [ ( 1) ( )] [ ( )] ( ) MG MG MG hs hs h =− ω − + λ ⋅ ρ−ω − +λ ⋅ −λ
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λ= − − ω − <
λ= − ρ−ω − <
λ= >
Zero growth rate, ZG
Finally, consider the steady state with  0 gg == ! . The dynamics are now governed by
(32) and (31) (note that we cannot use the system in (A.5), which is valid for g > 0
only). The Jacobian, evaluated at the steady state with  0 g η=θ= =  reads:
// ( 1 ) / 0
// 0 ( 1 ) /
∂η ∂η ∂η ∂θ −ρ −ω ω   
=    ∂θ ∂η ∂θ ∂θ − ρ −σ σ   
!!
!!







−ω  λ= − ρ  ω 
−σ  λ= − ρ  σ 
Adjustment and initial conditions
Two negative eigenvalues are associated with each steady state. This implies that the
initial values of (g, η , h) have to be located on the two-dimensional stable manifold,
spanned by the eigenvectors associated with the two negative eigenvalues. In the
linearised version, we can identify the initial condition as a the intersection between
the manifold and two planes to be defined as follows. First, the marginal product of
resource use has to be equalized across the two sectors, as described in equations
(36)-(38). By eliminating RY and RT between these equations, we find a relation
between g, η , θ  and n, say J(g, η , θ , n)=0, which – after substitution of the definition of
h (A.1) – defines a plane in the (g, η , h) space. Second, the resource stock has to be
asymptotically depleted, as described in equation (15). Substituting (36)-(37) into (15)
and integrating, we find a relation between g, η , θ , n, and WR, say J(g, η , θ , n, WR)=0,
which – after substitution of the definition of h – defines a plane in the (g, η , h) space.
The intersection between the two planes, defined for initial values n(0) and WR(0),
and the stable manifold determines the initial equilibrium. 
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